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We strive to overcome impunity for international crimes such as
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Our reasons may
include a vision of justice and perhaps a hope for deterrence.
Notwithstanding our aspirations to establish a regime of
accountability, impunity remains a recurrent pattern. Where an effort at
accountability is undertaken at all, it consistently is approached through a
second-best alternative to full and complete accountability - some form of
partial accountability and, hence, partial impunity. I will begin by briefly
examining the reasons for this consistent pattern of compromise and then
consider what contribution international guidelines on accountability might
make in moving toward a regime of consistent and meaningful
accountability.
Holding perpetrators fully accountable for their crimes would
include appropriate trial and punishment of each individual responsible for
the crimes committed, together with appropriate reparations made by
perpetrators to victims. In many contexts, one would wish also to utilize
some form of truth commission to ensure the credible and authoritative
revelation, documentation and memorialization of the events in question as
a comprehensive whole.
But that ideal of full accountability for international crimes is
never, in practice, attained. National and international efforts at achieving
accountability for such crimes typically resort to means designed to render
something less than full accountability. This occurs for three identifiable
reasons.
First, the resources required to achieve full accountability often are
prohibitive. The offenses in question typically involve large numbers of
perpetrators and victims. Prosecutions and other accountability
mechanisms as well as victim compensation schemes all therefore demand
extensive financial, physical, and human resources. Often, those demands
arise in post-conflict contexts in which the nations affected suffer from a
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dearth of resources. Rwanda provides perhaps the most extreme example.
There, tens of thousands are suspected of participation in genocide. The
Rwandan judiciary, along with much of the national infrastructure, was
destroyed in the course of the 1994 genocide and war. The resources
required to achieve full accountability in each case in Rwanda would
quickly overwhelm national capacities.
The second reason for the pattern of compromise is that political
considerations may constrain the extent to which accountability is pursued.
Such constraints arise from the need to continue to live with (and perhaps
to share power with or even to work toward reconciliation with) the
perpetrator population or constituency. Argentina and South Africa
exemplify two faces of this phenomenon. In Argentina, threats of military
insurrection halted the Alfonsin government's prosecutorial efforts to hold
accountable perpetrators of human rights abuses committed under the
former military regime. In South Africa's transition from apartheid, a
negotiated settlement to a political conflict that had already involved
bloodshed and had the potential to involve much more included a rather
robust amnesty provision. Such precarious balances of power, sometimes
involving military threats, often place political constraints upon the degree
of accountability to be sought.
Third and finally, all too often accountability fails for lack of will
at national or international levels. In such cases, there may be a denial that
the crimes were committed or crimes may be acknowledged, but resource
limitations or political constraints such as those just discussed may be used
as a pretext for inaction that is actually born of a lack of will. Failures of
will at the international level clearly have impeded the efficacy of the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
(ICTY/R) since their inception. Lack of commitment to the success of the
ICTY/R on the part of elements of the international community has been
reflected in a paucity of funding, failure to arrest indictees, and other
forms of obstructionism.
Because of these factors of resource limitations, political
constraints, or lack of will (or some combination of the three), national and
international bodies charged with the handling of international crimes
typically adopt a compromise or second-best approach. That approach
usually is comprised of some or all of the following elements. First, a
decision may be made to pursue accountability only for some subset of the
individuals responsible for the crimes. The ICTY/R, for example, is
expected to prosecute at most a few hundred of the thousands of
perpetrators in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The remaining bulk of
the perpetrators will have to be prosecuted in national courts or not at all.
And in South Africa, for instance, an amnesty is made available under
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specified conditions to all perpetrators of the relevant crimes except for
some few whom the amnesty-granting authority determines committed
crimes disproportionate to their political purpose.
A second element of a compromise approach may be some form of
plea-bargaining. Rwanda, for example, has passed specialized legislation
offering all but the most culpable category of perpetrators a substantial
sentence reduction in return for a full confession and guilty plea.
Third, a sentence-reduction may be provided for all perpetrators,
quite apart from a plea-bargain program. This may be done to relieve the
state of the long-term burden of supporting a massive prison population or
may be done in the interests of reconciliation.
Fourth, legal action may be taken against perpetrators for lesser
offenses than the genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity actually
committed. One version of this is prosecution for ordinary crimes (such as
murder or rape) where national legislation provides only for such offenses
and not for the greater, international crimes. Another frequently used
mechanism for taking legal action for a lesser offense is deprivation of
citizenship or immigrant status and, possibly, deportation on the ground
that the individual violated immigration regulations by failing to disclose
his criminal acts when applying for immigrant status or citizenship.
Second best approaches are taken not only in place of full criminal
prosecution but also in place of civil reparations from perpetrators to
victims. One such compromise is the award of an unenforceable (or
probably unenforceable) civil judgment (for example, where the
perpetrators' assets are outside of the country). Another compromise
approach to reparations is where a successor government (or the
international community) provides reparations to victims rather than the
perpetrators being made to do so. While often indispensable for purposes
of acknowledgment and rehabilitation of victims, this approach makes no
inroads against the impunity of perpetrators.
Finally, there are those approaches to accountability that are not
inherently compromises but are second-best when adopted in lieu of, rather
than in conjunction with, other mechanisms for accountability. These
include lustration and truth commissions, both of which may serve
important functions, but since they provide neither for criminal liability nor
for reparations, they cannot provide anything approaching full
accountability.
An array of compromise approaches to accountability thus has
been employed over the years by international as well as national entities.
Each compromise renders an outcome of partial accountability and, hence,
partial impunity. The draft Statute for an International Criminal Court also
does not offer a panacea of accountability, having strictly limiting
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jurisdictional provisions, and making only a weak mention of anything
approximating victim reparations. Accountability, thus, has not been and
will not in the foreseeable future become an all or nothing question, but
rather must be viewed as a matter of degree.
In sum, there is a spectrum of possible outcomes between complete
impunity and full accountability. As I have discussed, outcomes that fall
short of full accountability often are attributable to resource limitations and
political constraints as well as to a lack of will. It is with these points in
mind that I want now to consider the advisability of developing
international guidelines on accountability.
Given the predictable obstacles to accountability and the spectrum
of possible outcomes between complete impunity and full accountability,
we must ask, in considering guidelines on accountability, what forms of
accountability such guidelines would mandate. The guidelines might
provide that the type and extent of accountability that states are obliged to
establish would vary depending upon specified factors, which I will
discuss. The guidelines might also very usefully include a set of
facilitative provisions that would delineate mechanisms for the provision of
assistance to the states bearing the primary responsibilities for
accountability in order to facilitate their overcoming the predictable
obstacles to accountability.
Several factors would be relevant in determining in each context
the type of accountability mechanisms required of states and the extent of
their necessary scope. The most obvious of these factors would be the
nature of the offenses committed. Presumably, genocide, crimes against
humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions would give rise to
the strictest accountability requirements in guidelines that address a range
of international crimes.
Additional factors determining the type and extent of accountability
required would relate to the three chronic obstacles to accountability:
resource limitations, political constraints, and lack of will. Resource
limitations and political constraints may diminish the degree of
accountability and redress that a state can realistically be required to
achieve in a given context. For example, where the number of
perpetrators is high and availability of resources is low, the number of
defendants to be prosecuted may be smaller than the total number of
perpetrators. However, a diminution in standards of accountability should
be the very last resort, not the first response, to such obstacles. The first
line of response should be the provision of international facilitation in
overcoming those obstacles in order to achieve the greatest possible
measure of accountability. Thus, rather than only clarifying and
reiterating the mandate to achieve accountability, it may be useful for
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guidelines on accountability to include facilitative provisions that focus on
providing assistance in overcoming the predictable obstacles to
accountability.
In this regard, the guidelines could delineate responsibilities of
member states to facilitate the efforts of those states bearing the primary
responsibility for accountability by providing resources (financial, human
or physical) to a specified extent when delineated conditions arise
warranting such assistance. In particular, the guidelines might provide for
the creation of a judicial rapid reaction force or international legal
assistance consortium prepared to reinforce, supplement, and assist in the
rehabilitation of post-conflict national justice systems. Such an entity
would be prepared to respond quickly with the specialized expertise
required to help ensure accountability and judicial rehabilitation in a post-
conflict environment.
The guidelines' facilitative provisions might also address what I
will term a lack of political resources, which may often hamper national
efforts at establishing accountability. A lack of political resources would
be reflected in difficulties in gaining extradition, in obtaining evidence
outside the country, or in gaining access to perpetrators' assets that are
outside the country. The guidelines' facilitative provisions could help to
overcome political resource limitations by providing for forms of judicial
cooperation including special extradition or transfer arrangements,
mechanisms for evidence provision, and methods for freezing and
accessing perpetrators' offshore assets.
Addressing the second of the three major obstacles to
accountability, political constraints, will be more complex. The parties
might undertake to provide mediation or even military intervention to
foster accountability under some circumstances. One can readily envision
limits to what would be possible in this regard. The mixed results of
peacekeeping and related missions trace those limits all too graphically.
Nevertheless, diplomatic and military interventions can be effective in
some contexts, and could be brought much more to bear in the cause of
accountability,
A special problem, falling within the category of political
constraints, is the risk of bias or the appearance of bias in the
national accountability process. Where the regime administering
accountability does so after prevailing in a conflict with those now
being brought to justice, the reality or appearance of victors'
justice may taint the proceedings, undermining their claim to
legitimacy. One form of international facilitation that may help to
ameliorate this potential problem would be the provision of
international monitoring to help ensure the impartiality of the
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accountability process. If the monitoring agency has the
confidence of the parties (particularly of the party fearing bias),
then the monitoring function may be valuable in minimizing the
potential problem of bias or the appearance of bias in the
accountability process.
Finally, the guidelines could address a lack of will to pursue
accountability. A specific delineation of the extent and form of
accountability mandated under specified conditions would clarify the
parties' obligations. With obligations clarified, pressure for compliance
could be brought to bear. At the same time, assuring assistance in
overcoming resource limitations and political constraints would render
those obstacles less readily available as pretexts for inaction actually born
of a lack of will.
A set of guidelines on accountability could, in its preamble,
articulate the aspiration of eliminating impunity. In their substantive
provisions, the guidelines could clarify and articulate what is required
nationally and internationally in the pursuit of accountability. The
facilitative provisions could ensure assistance in overcoming the
predictable obstacles to accountability. By doing all of that, the guidelines
could eliminate ambiguities, obstacles and excuses so that appropriate
pressure could be brought to bear on those who would otherwise lack the
will to pursue accountability. By crafting guidelines that clarify national
and international responsibilities to establish accountability and that also
provide for facilitation and assistance to states bearing primary
responsibility for establishing that accountability, the likelihood is
heightened that some substantial measure of accountability will, in fact, be
achieved. The key in drafting guidelines on accountability would be to
facilitate as well as to demand the greatest degree of accountability that is
realistically possible in order to maximize the degree of accountability
achieved in each instance in which perpetrators must be called to account.
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